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This paper analyzes the welfare e⁄ects of altruism on the optimal ￿scal policy. The
existence of positive bequests links present and future generations in the economy. We
show that these altruistic links provide a new role for indirect taxation (consumption
and estate taxes) with important welfare implications. We use three di⁄erent altru-
istic approaches (warm-glow, dynastic, and family) to illustrate how the presence of
bequests in the budget constraint of the donee gives the government the ability to use
indirect taxation to mimic lump-sum taxation and to implement the ￿rst-best outcome
in the long-run. This channel is not present in economies without altruism, such as
the in￿nite-lived consumer economy or the overlapping generations economy, where
long-run welfare is suboptimal and indirect taxation is irrelevant.
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11 Introduction
A very important question in macroeconomics is how the ￿scal policy should be determined
in the long-run. The integration of public ￿nance into macroeconomics suggests that taxa-
tion should be optimally set to maximize society￿ s welfare. Using a traditional macro model
with in￿nite-lived consumers, Judd (1985) and Chamley (1986) show that the optimal capital
income tax should be zero in the long-run. However, in an overlapping generations economy,
Escolano (1992), Garriga (1999), and Erosa and Gervais (2002) conclude that once we con-
sider intergenerational redistribution, a non-zero capital income tax is not suboptimal. The
main di⁄erences between both canonical macro models are the assumptions about parental
links. The in￿nite-lived consumer model assumes a perfect link using a homogeneity assump-
tion between present and future generations. The standard overlapping generations model
assumes no intergenerational links between cohorts. Therefore, the existence of altruism
between generations seems to play an important role in the determination of the optimal
policy.
At the aggregate level the importance of altruism is evident, as it is shown in the empirical
studies of Gale and Scholz (1994) or Davies and Shorrocks (2000). Nonetheless, one of
the most serious di¢ culties in studying this problem is that the empirical evidence is not
conclusive on why individuals leave bequests, and the design of the optimal ￿scal policy
should depend on it. There exists an extensive literature that proposes and tests several
di⁄erent motives: intended, accidental or unintended, and a mixture of both; see Laitner
(1997) for a detailed survey. Unfortunately, none of the theories seem to be conclusive since
the results from the empirical tests are ambiguous.
In this paper we explore the connection between altruism and the optimal ￿scal policy
and its implications for welfare. From a normative perspective, unintended bequests should
be taxed at a con￿scatory rate since this strategy would allow a Ramsey government to
minimize other distortions and to enhance welfare.1 In the presence of intended bequests a
con￿scatory estate tax would have severe consequences on the willingness to bequeath and
the welfare of the donors. Thus, with altruism a Ramsey government can use estate taxation
as an additional instrument to spread the tax burden across di⁄erent margins.2 To analyze
the aforementioned connection, we consider three formulations of intended bequests. First,
we focus the attention to joy-of-giving or warm-glow altruism.3 In this framework, parents
derive utility directly from giving bequests to their o⁄springs, as in Yaari (1965).4 Second, we
analyze a model with dynastic altruism, where parents derive utility directly from the utility
1Kopczuk (2003) shows that a 100 percent estate tax can have an indirect e⁄ect that might reduce the
labor supply. As a result, a 100 percent tax might not be desirable.
2We assume that estate taxes are paid by the donor and not by the donee who receives the bequest.
Otherwise the optimal ￿scal policy can be trivial in some cases because estate taxation can become an
e⁄ective lump-sum tax.
3In the analysis we use a two period economy for two reasons. The ￿rst one is to have comparable results
with previous work in the literature. Second, models with more than two periods impose some constraints
in the set of ￿scal instruments if age-speci￿c taxes are not allowed; see Escolano (1992), Garriga (1999),
and Erosa and Gervais (2002). These restrictions usually imply capital income taxes di⁄erent from zero.
Therefore, given that we want to study the pure e⁄ects of altruism, the driving forces of the main results
should not depend on exogenous restrictions on the set of instruments that the government can use.
4A large scale version of this model, where generations live more than two periods, is consistent with the
observed wealth distribution (see de Nardi, 2004).
2of their o⁄springs, as in Barro (1974). And, third, we follow Becker (1991) and consider
the family altruism, where parents derive utility from the future disposable income of their
o⁄springs. This framework can be interpreted as an intermediate case between warm-glow
and dynastic altruism and it is helpful to analyze the consistency of the results.
The existence of positive bequests links present and future generations in the economy.
We show that altruistic links give rise to a new role for indirect taxation (consumption and
estate taxes) with important welfare implications. The presence of a bequest in the budget
constraint of the donee gives the government the ability to use indirect taxation to control the
intratemporal allocation of resources and mimic lump-sum taxation. The government can
then set the remaining tax rates to eliminate the distortions in the intra and intertemporal
decisions and implement a ￿rst-best outcome in the long-run. We show that this mechanism,
via indirect taxation, operates in all three altruistic approaches (warm-glow, dynastic, and
family) in contrast to the in￿nite-lived consumer economy or the overlapping generations
economy, where long-run welfare is suboptimal and indirect taxation is irrelevant.5 The
results for the transition path in the presence of altruism depend on speci￿c assumptions
of date 0 taxation.6 In the economy with warm-glow altruism the choice of the initial
consumption and capital income tax allow to reach the ￿rst-best path. In the dynastic
altruism, the economy is in the ￿rst-best path regardless of the government availability to
choose initial taxes, whereas in the family altruism the government only needs to be able to
choose the indirect tax to be in the ￿rst-best path.
Perhaps a striking result is the di⁄erent outcome that one obtains from solving the
dynastic economy and the in￿nitely-lived consumer economy. We argue that in the later
economy there is an implicit homogeneity assumption that prevents the government to use
indirect taxation to control the intratemporal allocation of resources. To be more speci￿c, in
the dynastic economy there is a distinction between bequests and ￿nancial assets. Bequests
are not transacted in the market whereas the ￿nancial assets are acquired at each period
by the current young cohort. Consequently, the government can di⁄erentiate the taxation
of transfers from the taxation of ￿nancial assets. In contrast, in the in￿nite-lived economy
the size of bequests has to be consistent with the size of ￿nancial assets, and there is no
room to di⁄erentiate the tax treatment. This implicit assumption is captured by the fact
that the government only faces one implementability constraint (the link is implicit), while
in the dynastic economy we have an in￿nite sequence of implementability constraints (the
link is explicit).
It is important to make a few remarks about the paper ￿ndings. In general, de￿ning
e¢ ciency or ￿rst-best allocations in an economy with warm-glow or family altruism is a
complicated matter. There are some papers in the literature that provide e¢ ciency concepts
in this type of economies. The implicit concept that we have in mind is one where the
￿rst-best equilibrium has no unnecessary distortions and where external e⁄ects are internal-
5Formally, there is one tax that has the same role as debt and, therefore, the optimal ￿scal policy is not
altered if either the consumption tax or the debt is removed from the set of ￿scal instruments available to
the government. That is, there is one more tax than number of individual decisions to control.
6In in￿nite horizon economies, the role of initial taxation is critical since it can be used to mimic lump-
sum taxation. However, in overlapping generations economies this assumption is not very important since
initial taxes can only be used as a lump-sum tax for the initial cohort. In the presence of altruism the choice
of initial taxes has a di⁄erent role, since individuals live a ￿nite number of periods but di⁄erent cohorts are
linked through bequests.
3ized.7 Second, our ￿ndings require that bequests are positive; otherwise the economy would
behave as a standard overlapping generations economy. That requires making speci￿c as-
sumptions in preferences towards bequests (i.e., Inada conditions) or discount rates. Third,
the economies analyzed in the paper ignore uncertainty or the presence of intra-cohort het-
erogeneity. We think it would be straightforward to generalize the results to include state
contingent taxes and government debt. The presence of uncertainty would certainly not
eliminate the operating mechanism of altruism, although it could be important for quanti-
tative results. Modeling intragenerational heterogeneity in the context of Ramsey taxation
sometimes requires making additional assumptions about the set of tax instruments. These
details have been extensively addressed in papers such as Chari and Kehoe (1999), Garriga
(1999), or more recently Shin (2005). As usual in the Ramsey taxation literature, time-
consistency issues are often ignored (see Martin, 2009, for a recent treatment). We think
this dimension is not a severe restriction in the generality of the results, since our focus is
the role of indirect taxation to attaining ￿rst-best allocations, and we know since Fisher
(1980) that the optimal plans of a government that has access to e⁄ective lump-sum taxes
are time-consistent.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes some known results about the
role of indirect taxation in economies without altruism. Section 3 presents the basic results
for the warm-glow model. The dynastic altruism and the family altruism optimal ￿scal
policies are discussed in section 4 and 5, respectively. Finally, section 6 concludes. The
proofs of the propositions are in the Appendix.
2 Indirect Taxation in Economies without Altruism
In this section we present some standard results that show that in both the standard in￿nite-
lived consumer economy and the overlapping generations economy the presence of indirect
taxation is irrelevant for the determination of the optimal ￿scal policy when the government
has access to a full set of distortionary taxes. These two formulations are used as simple
benchmarks to clarify the exposition, and they are not meant to be representative of models
as they exist in the literature today. Our contribution is to show that in economies where
intended altruism is modelled, indirect taxation is relevant since it has important implications
for the path of optimal taxes and welfare.
2.1 In￿nite-Lived Consumer Economy
We consider a neoclassical production economy with population growing at the rate n. Out-
put is produced according to a constant returns to scale technology f (kt;lt); where kt and lt
denote the capital stock and labor, respectively. Any variable mt is expressed in per capita
terms of born at period t. The production function f is strictly concave, C2; and satis￿es
the Inada conditions. At each period capital depreciates at a constant positive rate ￿: With
competitive markets each input receives its marginal product, i.e., rt = fkt ￿￿ and wt = flt;
where rt is the return on capital, wt is the wage rate, and fmt is the derivative of f with
respect to mt.
7See Garriga and SÆnchez-Losada (2009) for the analysis of the ￿rst-best in a warm-glow economy.
4Households are in￿nite-lived and identical. In each period individuals choose consumption
ct; asset holdings at+1; and the allocation of their one unit of time endowment between work
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capital and labor income proportional taxes, respectively. The utility function U is strictly
concave, C2; and satis￿es the usual Inada conditions. In order to prevent Ponzi schemes, the
optimization problem is also subject to the non-binding borrowing constraint at+1 ￿ ￿A;
























and the corresponding transversality condition for asset holdings, where Umt is the derivative
of U with respect to mt:




t=0 be a ￿scal policy8 and the period government budget be
de￿ned by







where dt and gt denote government debt and a non-productive government expenditure,
respectively, and Rt is the return on government bonds. There is a non-arbitrage condition
between the return on government bonds and capital, Rt+1 = 1+rt+1(1￿￿k
t+1). The amount
of government debt is bounded by a large positive constant to ensure that the government
budget constraint is satis￿ed in present value. Financial assets are allocated either in form
of capital or government bonds, so that at+1 = (kt+1 + dt+1) is satis￿ed in equilibrium. The
economy resource constraint or feasibility constraint is
ct + (1 + n)kt+1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)kt + gt = f(kt;lt); 8t: (6)
We consider a government (Ramsey problem) that chooses and commits to a tax policy
plan that maximizes society￿ s welfare. In order to solve the government problem, we use
the primal approach of optimal taxation proposed by Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980). This
approach is based on characterizing the set of allocations that the government can implement




0g; and the initial conditions a0 = k0 + d0:9 We follow Chari and Kehoe (1999)
8We will discuss in each case the importance that the government can or not choose some taxes at t = 0:
9The set of implementable allocations is described by the period resource constraints and the so-called
implementability constraints. These constraints capture the e⁄ect that changes in the tax policy have on
agents decisions and market prices. Thus, the government problem amounts to maximize its objective
function over the set of implementable allocations. The implementability constraint (7) directly follows
Chari and Kehoe (1999).





















(k0 + d0); (7)
and the resource constraint (6). Writing the Lagrange function and rede￿ning the govern-
ment period objective function as W(ct;lt) = U +’(ctUct + ltUlt); where ’ is the Lagrange





(1 ￿ ￿ + fkt+1)
(1 + n)







; 8t > 0; (9)
where Wmt is the derivative of W with respect to mt. The optimality conditions at t = 0
include additional terms showing the fact that the initial level of capital is given, as the right
hand side of (7) shows. The optimal ￿scal policy can be implemented by substituting the

















; 8t > 0; (10)
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; 8t > 0: (11)




t=0; there exists an in-




t=0 that satisfy these two equations,
i.e., one of the tax instruments is redundant. For example, the choice of a particular con-
sumption tax path f￿c
t+1g1




t=0 given by (10) and (11) and the government debt level fdt+1g1
t=0 given by (5),
but not the allocation implied by the optimal policy and its associated welfare. A non-zero
capital income tax ￿k
t+1 6= 0 for all t implies a non-constant sequence of consumption taxes
￿c
t 6= ￿c
t+1 for all t: Since time varying taxes are usually not observed, it is common to
normalize the path of indirect taxes to zero, f￿c
t+1g1
t=0 = 0.
It is important to remark that if the government can choose the initial tax on either
consumption ￿c
0 or capital ￿k
0; then the ￿rst-best path allocation can be implemented, since
any initial tax would be chosen such that the implementability constraint (7) is satis￿ed.10








1 + r0(1 ￿ ￿k
0)
￿




Note that, for example, consumption taxes can be used as a wealth tax on the initial asset endowment. The













62.2 Overlapping Generations Economy
As a second baseline, we construct an overlapping generations economy where individuals live
for two periods.11 Young generations are endowed with one unit of time which they allocate
between work and leisure. Then, they choose consumption c1t and asset holdings at. Old
individuals do not work and consume c2t+1: The production structure remains unchanged,
and both the goverment budget constraint (5) and the resource constraint (6) are modi￿ed
such that ct = c1t + c2t=(1 + n): The aggregate level of asset holdings equals the stock of
physical capital and government debt at t + 1; so that at = (kt+1 + dt+1)(1 + n):
In this environment, the representative newborn generation in period t solves
max
fc1t;c2t+1;ltg
U(c1t;lt) + ￿Z(c2t+1); (12)
s:t: (1 + ￿
c












where the utility function Z is strictly concave, C2 and satis￿es the usual Inada conditions.
We abuse the notation and use the same representation U for the utility of young individuals























where Zmt is the derivative of Z with respect to mt: At t = 0, there exists an initial generation
who owns all the assets in the economy and consumes c20 =
￿





The government problem is a bit more cumbersome since we have an in￿nite number
of generations. A standard way to deal with it is to assign weights to each cohort. Let
￿ 2 (0;1) represents the relative weight that the government places between current and









s:t: c1tUc1t + ltUlt + ￿c2t+1Zc2t+1 = 0; 8t; (18)
the feasibility constraint (6), and the consumption decision of the initial generation (14).
The ￿rst constraint is the implementability condition of newborn generations, and it is
constructed by replacing the ￿rst-order conditions of the consumer problem in the budget
constraint. The third constraint is the implementability condition of the initial old individual.
Writing the Lagrange function and abusing the notation by rede￿ning the functions as
W(c1t;lt) = U + ’t (c1tUc1t + ltUlt) and W(c2t+1) = Z + ’tc2t+1Zc2t+1; where ’t is the La-
grange multiplier associated to the implementability constraint (18), the Ramsey optimality
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; 8t > 0: (21)
Combining the optimality conditions of the government problem with the ￿rst-order condi-

















; 8t > 0; (22)
￿
l










; 8t > 0: (23)
An inspection of these two equations suggests that this overlapping generations economy
also leads to the redundancy of indirect taxation. This is the case even when the optimal
capital income tax is not zero in steady state. Moreover, whereas in the in￿nite-lived con-
sumer economy the choice of initial consumption and capital income taxes f￿c
0;￿k
0g could be
used to mimic lump-sum taxation and eliminate all future distortions, in the overlapping
generations economy the choice of initial instruments has no role since they cannot be used
to mimic lump-sum taxation beyond the initial period.
Next, we argue that in economies with intended altruism the redundancy results do not
longer hold. Since di⁄erent bequest motives imply di⁄erent formalizations of the government
problem (i.e., di⁄erent sets of implementable allocations), we can only proceed by showing
the role of indirect taxation in the three most popular formulations of intended altruism.
3 Warm-Glow Altruism Economy
In this section we extend the overlapping generations economy to include warm-glow altru-
ism. In this economy young generations receive a physical bequest bt from their parents and
when they become old, they leave a bequest to their o⁄springs (1 + n)bt+1, so that each child
receives bt+1. The warm-glow altruism implies that individuals derive utility from giving be-
quests to their children, but they do not derive it directly from their children happiness. In
this environment, the representative generation in period t solves
max
fc1t;c2t+1;at+1;lt;bt+1g
U(c1t;lt) + ￿Q(c2t+1;bt+1); (24)
s:t: (1 + ￿
c
t)c1t + at+1 = (1 ￿ ￿
l
t)wtlt + bt; (25)
(1 + ￿
c
t+1)c2t+1 + (1 + ￿
b
t+1)(1 + n)bt+1 = at+1
￿






t+1 is a distortionary estate tax paid by the donor. This particular formalization
where the donee receives an after tax transfer prevents estate taxation to become an e⁄ec-
tive lump-sum tax.12 Also note that the estate tax is an indirect tax because the bequest
12If the donee is taxed, then we should assume that the donor is interested on the net bequest received by
the donee.
8represents a pure consumption good for the donors. The utility function Q is strictly con-
cave, C2 and satis￿es the usual Inada conditions. The ￿rst-order conditions for a newborn




























(1 + n)(1 + ￿b
t+1)
; (29)
where Qmt is the derivative of Q with respect to mt. Note that the ratio of consumption
to bequest taxes a⁄ects the bene￿ts (marginal utility obtained by the donor of the given
bequest) and the costs (marginal utility of the foregone consumption of the donor) from
leaving bequests. The government can use these instruments to alter the intergenerational
transfers.





s:t: (1 + ￿
c
0)c20 + (1 + ￿
b
0)(1 + n)b0 =
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(k0 + d0)(1 + n): (31)
The government budget constraint needs to be modi￿ed to incorporate estate taxation. Let





t=0. Then, the government budget
constraint is















The resource constraint is equation (6) but modi￿ed with ct = c1t+c2t=(1 + n): The market
clearing condition in the capital market is at+1 = (kt+1 + dt+1)(1 + n):
In an economy with intended bequests, the Ramsey taxation problem has to determine
the optimal path for estate taxation. The presence of altruism provides a new role for indirect
taxation since each cohort is connected to past and future individuals through altruism. We
argue that the government can use indirect taxation to change the intertemporal allocation





















; 8t ￿ 0; (34)
c20Qc20 + b0Qb0 =
Qc20
￿
1 + (1 ￿ ￿k
0)(fk0 ￿ ￿)
￿




13As in Michel and Pestieau (2004), we exclude non-interior solutions for the leisure decision.
9and the resource constraint (6). The construction of the set of implementable allocations
can be found in the Appendix.
The implementability constraint for each newborn generation (34) incorporates the be-
quest received from the older generation. Due to the existence of positive bequests, bt > 0;
the government can choose a path of consumption taxes f￿c
tg1
t=1 directly from the set of
implementable allocations and use indirect taxation as an e⁄ective lump-sum tax for each
period.
With positive bequests, bt > 0; the implementability constraint can always be satis￿ed
for any feasible allocation making the Lagrange multiplier of the constraint of each new-
born generation equal to zero 8t ￿ 1: The path of consumption taxes is used to redistribute
resources across cohorts over time in a non-distortionary way. This mechanism provides a
di⁄erent role for indirect taxation that is not present in economies without altruism.14 In the
absence of bequests, bt = 0; the model would behave as the overlapping generations econ-
omy discussed in Section 2 and indirect taxation would be irrelevant. In our formulation,
the positiveness of bequests is guaranteed by the Inada condition limb!0 Qb = 1: This can
be summarized in the next proposition.
Proposition 1: In an economy with warm-glow altruism, when the government can choose
the path of consumption taxes f￿c
tg1
t=1; the steady state allocation associated to the optimal
(second-best) policy coincides with the steady state allocation of the ￿rst-best.
The proposition suggests that the welfare implied from the optimal tax policy converges
to the ￿rst-best level in the long-run. The welfare level associated to the ￿rst-best allocation
depends on the particulars of its de￿nition. A key issue in the presence of warm-glow altru-
ism is that the donor neglects the indirect impact of altruism on the donee. However, the
treatment of this external e⁄ect has important implications in the ￿rst-best policy since dis-
tortions could be necessary at the margin in light of the trade-o⁄involved between e¢ ciency
and the optimal policy induced by handling the external e⁄ect. Garriga and SÆnchez-Losada
(2009) explore these implications and provide a ￿rst-best de￿nition where this externalities
are corrected.15 The result from Proposition 1 suggests that the presence of indirect taxation
14Note that in this economy the estate tax is also an indirect tax. Using (29) and (34), we we can rewrite
the implementability constraint as






Qc2t (1 + n)(1 + ￿b
t)
; 8t ￿ 0:
Therefore, we could use the estate tax instead of the consumption tax.
15Their de￿nition of e¢ ciency in an economy with warm-glow altruism raises a number of issues. Since
bequests are not part of the resource constraint of the economy, some authors have claimed that they should
be in￿nite and, then, individuals derive a non-bounded utility from giving at no real resource cost. To
avoid this problem, a common strategy has been to eliminate any warm-glow (or utility interdependence)
in the notion of social optimum. Even though e¢ cient allocations are well-de￿ned in this reduced context,
the social planner ignores individual preferences and it does not consider the indirect e⁄ect that the donor
transfer has on the donee. Garriga and SÆnchez-Losada (2009) provide an alternative de￿nition arguing that
the previous de￿nitions ignore an implicit constraint in the act of giving: the donor cannot bequeath to
the donee more than her existing available resources. Their de￿nition of ￿rst-best respects this constraint
inherent to the act of giving, but it also allows to redistribute resources and to attain the socially e¢ cient
level of altruism.
10allows to achieve a ￿rst-best steady state allocation where the presence of external e⁄ects
are internalized. When the government can use some taxes at t = 0 in addition to the future
path of indirect taxation, the ￿ndings from Proposition 1 can be extended to the transition.
Corollary 1: In an economy with warm-glow altruism, if the government can choose ￿c
0
and ￿k
0 in addition to the sequence of consumption taxes f￿c
tg1
t=1; then the economy follows
the ￿rst-best path.
Inspection of the constraints of the set of implementable allocations suggest that the
path of capital accumulation is a⁄ected by the initial taxation f￿k
0;￿c
0;￿b
0g: In contrast with
the in￿nite-lived consumer economy, the choice of ￿c
0 would not be su¢ cient to ensure a
￿rst-best path because this instrument cannot be used by the government to control the
initial level of bequest b0: The government needs to choose ￿k
0 in order to control b0: We
need both instruments to ensure that (34) and (35) at date 0 are mutually satis￿ed. Only
in this this case the value of ￿k
0 becomes a lump-sum tax to the old generation and the value
of ￿c
0 becomes a lump-sum tax to the newborn generation born at t = 0; and the path of
the economy becomes undistorted. After the choice of both the initial taxes f￿c
0;￿k
0g and
the path of optimal consumption taxes f￿c
tg1
t=1; the remainder taxes are set to satisfy the
individual ￿rst-order conditions evaluated at the ￿rst-best allocation, fb c1t;b c2t;b lt;b bt;b kt+1g1
t=0:
The intuition is very clear by inspecting the consolidated budget constraint. Combining (25)





















In this economy consumption taxes are not redundant due to the presence of bequests. This
instrument can be used at every period to mimic lump-sum taxation and correct the tax
burden in other margins based on the consumer ￿rst-order conditions.
In the initial speci￿cation we have assumed that the donor only considers the level
of bequest bt; but not the e⁄ective value or real bequests bt=(1 + ￿c
t): Using a warm-
glow speci￿cation on real bequest implies a second period utility function characterized
by Q(c2t+1;bt+1=(1 + ￿c
t+1)): In this case, the implementability constraint becomes











; 8t ￿ 0; (37)
from where it is clear that the result stated in Proposition 1 does not change.
4 Dynastic Altruism Economy
In this section we analyze the dynastic altruism, where individuals derive utility from their
children well-being, but they do not derive it from giving bequests directly to their children.
This framework is useful to compare the results with the in￿nite-lived consumer economy.
In this case, individual preferences are
Vt = U(c1t;lt) + ￿Z(c2t+1) + ￿Vt+1; (38)
11where Vt+1 is the utility of their o⁄springs and ￿ is the altruism factor. In order to ensure
that Vt is bounded from above, we assume that ￿ 2 (0;1): A newborn generation maximizes
(38) subject to (25) and (26). The initial old generation solves a similar problem. Using the















(1 + n)￿Zc2t+1(1 + ￿b
t+1)
￿ 1; (= 1 if bt+1 > 0): (40)
In contrast with the warm-glow altruism, in the dynastic altruism the consumption tax
equally a⁄ects the bene￿ts (marginal utility obtained by the donor from the marginal increase
in their children￿ s welfare) and the costs (marginal utility of the foregone consumption of
the donor) from leaving bequests and, hence, this tax does not alter the intergenerational
transfers. Thus, the government can determine the after-tax bequests without changing
the before-tax bequests. Also note that an estate tax paid by the donor has the same
distortionary e⁄ects as a tax on the inheritance received by the donee. As has been pointed
out by CaballØ (1988), the threshold level of the altruism factor ￿ above (below) which the
bequest motive is (is not) operative depends on the ￿scal policy. In order to have comparable
results with the previous section we assume that the altruism factor ￿ is high enough so that
bequests are always operative, bt+1 > 0:
In this model non-zero capital income taxes are optimal when the government and con-
sumers discount future generations at di⁄erent rates. Spataro and De Bonis (2005) argue
that when the government is more (less) patient than consumers, it is optimal to subsidize
(tax) capital even when lump-sum taxes are available. Therefore, a ￿rst-best allocation when
￿ 6= ￿ could imply distortions in the savings rate. A simple alternative to avoid this prob-
lem is to assume that consumers and government discount future cohorts at the same rate,
￿ = ￿; which we assume. The role of di⁄erent discount rates has been studied by Farhi and
Werning (2006) and Sleet and Yeltekin (2006). For the purpose of our discussion on indirect
taxation, this is not a relevant issue since it only matters to the extend that the de￿nition
of ￿rst-best is a⁄ected.





























1 + (1 ￿ ￿k
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and the resource constraint (6). Note that the assumed government objective function co-
incides with the case of a government that maximizes the utility function of the initial old.
This particular choice eliminates the well-known problem of double counting cohorts in social
preferences, i.e., the younger cohort appears ￿rst as an independent argument in the social
welfare function and, second, through the utility function of the altruistic individual.
12In the dynastic economy bequests are exclusively used to transfer resources across gen-
erations and only have partial in￿ uence on the decision of future cohorts. The government
can use indirect taxation to manipulate this intertemporal allocation of resources that links
current and future cohorts and attain a ￿rst-best path.
Proposition 2: In the dynastic economy, the choice of indirect taxation f￿c
tg1
t=1 allows to
attain the ￿rst-best path from t > 0 regardless of the initial tax rates.
This result contrasts with the ￿ndings in the in￿nite-lived consumer economy where the
￿rst-best allocation can only be achieved if the government can choose taxes at t = 0,
otherwise the ￿rst-best allocation can never be attained. The ￿ndings from Proposition
2 immediately suggest that the welfare associated to the optimal policies attained in the
dynastic economy is higher than in the in￿nite-lived consumer economy. This is the case
even when both economies prescribe zero long-run capital income taxes.
Why both economies can deliver di⁄erent results? In contrast with the in￿nite-lived
consumer economy, in the dynastic economy there is a distinction between bequests and
￿nancial assets. Bequests are not transacted in the market, whereas the ￿nancial assets are
acquired at each period by the younger cohort. Consequently, the government can di⁄er-
entiate the taxation of transfers from the taxation of ￿nancial assets. This di⁄erentiation
allows to manipulate the intertemporal allocation of resources using indirect taxation on the
recipients of the donee. In the in￿nite-lived consumer economy the size of the bequest has
to be consistent with the size of ￿nancial assets with no room for di⁄erentiation in the tax
treatment. To illustrate the argument formally consider the individual budget constraint of
a dynastic family where individuals live one period
c1t + (1 + n)bt+1 = wtlt + bt(1 + rt); (44)
and the budget constraint of an in￿nite-lived consumer economy,
c1t + (1 + n)at+1 = wtlt + at(1 + rt); (45)
where in order to simplify the argument we have eliminated taxes from the notation. In view
of these constraints, it is clear that in the in￿nite-lived consumer economy we impose ad-hoc
homogeneity of individuals by forcing the individuals to save nat+1: There is an implicit tax
n on savings and the resulting collected quantity is given as a capitalized lump-sum subsidy
to the new individuals of this economy. In the dynastic economy, it is the individual decision
about bequests nbt+1 what causes the homogeneity, but this homogeneity of individuals is
only within the new cohort.16
Now, let￿ s turn on the two-period dynastic economy. The budget constraint of the older
cohort is given by
c2t+1 + (1 + n)bt+1 = at+1(1 + rt+1): (46)
In this economy, individuals give a bequest to their o⁄springs, but they sell their ￿nancial
assets to the younger cohort, so that in general at+1 6= bt+1.17 Notice that this is true even
when the older cohort supplies labor. By contrast, in the in￿nite-lived consumer economy
16We owe this intuition to Daniel Cardona.
17Note that this rationale does not depend on the magnitude of n:
13we force parents to bequeath to their children their same ￿nancial wealth, at+1 = bt+1: It is
this ad-hoc homogeneity assumption that eliminates the government ability to use bequests
to control intratemporal decisions. This implicit assumption is captured by the fact that the
government only faces one implementability constraint, while in the dynastic economy we
have an in￿nite sequence of implementability constraints.18 This distinction is the crucial
element that allows the government to use indirect taxation to implement a ￿rst-best outcome
in the presence of dynastic altruism and not in the in￿nite-lived consumer economy.
5 Family Altruism Economy
To complete the analysis, we analyze an economy with family altruism where individuals
derive utility from their children￿ s disposable income. In this case, individual preferences are
U(c1t;lt) + ￿X(c2t+1;!t+1); (47)
where !t+1 = (1￿￿l
t+1)wt+1lt+1+bt+1 is the income of each adult children. The utility func-
tion X is strictly concave, C2 and satisfy the usual Inada conditions. A newborn generation
maximizes (47) subject to (25) and (26). The initial old generation solves a similar problem.
















Xc2t+1 (1 + n)(1 + ￿b
t+1)
￿ 1; (= 1 if bt+1 > 0); (49)
where Xmt is the derivative of X with respect to mt: Note that consumption taxes a⁄ect
the size of the bequest in the same way as in the warm-glow altruism. As has been pointed
out by Lambrecht et al. (2005), the bequest motive can be non-operative. Since we are
interested on the analysis of altruism, we assume that the altruism motive is high enough so
that bequests are always operative, bt+1 > 0:




























; 8t ￿ 0; (51)
18Following Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980), the implementability constraints are the households￿present
value budget constraint after substituting in the ￿rst-order conditions of the consumers￿and the ￿rms￿prob-
lems. Thus, it is not true neither that in the in￿nite-lived consumer economy the following implementability
constraint for every period,









can be written, since the households￿present value budget constraint has not been used, nor that all the in-
dividual implementability constraints (42) can be added up, since each generation has her own intertemporal
budget constraint that has to be satis￿ed.
14c20Xc20 + b0X!0 =
Xc20
￿
1 + (1 ￿ ￿k
0)(fk0 ￿ ￿)
￿




and the resource constraint (6). Note that we have substituted for ￿l
t from (28) into !t.
Although the altruism motive is di⁄erent than the previous examples, the operative
mechanism of indirect taxation is the same. Note that the implementability constraint for
each newborn generation (51) incorporates the bequest received from the older generation.
Due to the existence of positive bequests, bt > 0; the government can choose the path
of consumption taxes f￿c
tg1
t=1 and bequests fbtg1
t=1 directly from the set of implementable
allocations and use them as an e⁄ective lump-sum tax to implement an undistorted solution.
The income of each children f!tg1
t=1 can be computed by solving the resulting problem
where the resource constraint is the only binding constraint.19
Proposition 3: In an economy with family altruism, when the government can choose
the path of consumption taxes f￿c
tg1
t=1; the steady state allocation associated to the optimal
(second-best) policy coincides with the steady state allocation of the ￿rst-best.
When consumption taxes at date 0 are a choice variable, the initial consumption tax
becomes a lump-sum tax to the ￿rst newborn generation at the same time that !0 takes the
government required value, so that the path of the economy becomes undistorted.20 This is
in contrast with the warm-glow altruism, where two initial taxes are needed.
Corollary 2: In an economy with family altruism, if the government can choose ￿c
0 in ad-
dition to the sequence of consumption taxes f￿c
tg1
t=1, then the economy follows the ￿rst-best
path.
6 Conclusions
We analyze the welfare e⁄ects of altruism on the optimal ￿scal policy. The existence of
positive bequests links present and future generations in the economy. We show that al-
truistic links give rise to a new role for indirect taxation (consumption and estate taxes)
with important welfare implications since this instrument can be used to attain ￿rst-best
allocations in the long-run. We argue that the mechanism through which indirect taxation
operates is the same in all three altruistic approaches (warm-glow, dynastic, and family).
This channel is not present in models without altruism, such as the in￿nite-lived consumer
economy or the overlapping generations economy, where long-run welfare is suboptimal and
indirect taxation is irrelevant.
A striking ￿nding is the di⁄erent outcomes that one obtains from solving the dynastic
economy and the in￿nitely-lived consumer economy. We argue that in the later economy
there is an implicit homogeneity assumption that prevents the government to use indirect
taxation to control the intratemporal allocation of resources. This implicit assumption is
19Note that the external e⁄ect of bequests causes the government to introduce distortions in the ￿rst-best
steady state policy in order to correct this e⁄ect.




15captured by the fact that the government only faces one implementability constraint (the link
is implicit), while in the dynastic economy we have an in￿nite sequence of implementability
constraints (the link is explicit).
16Appendix
Construction of the set of implementable allocations: An allocation in the compet-
itive equilibrium fc1t;c2t;kt+1;bt;ltg1
t=0 satis￿es the set of implementable allocations. More-
over, if an allocation is implementable, then we can construct a ￿scal policy ￿ and competitive
prices frt;wt;Rtg1
t=0; such that the allocation together with prices and the policy ￿ consti-
tute a competitive equilibrium.
Proof: We start by proving the ￿rst part of the proposition. Any competitive equilibrium
allocation has to satisfy the economy resource constraint. The implementability constraints




(29) in the individual intertemporal budget constraint. The initial old agent at t = 0 has
a di⁄erent implementability constraint (35) because she is endowed with the initial stock of
capital and debt. It can be derived using the same procedure.
Now we prove the second part of the proposition. Given an implementable allocation
fc1t;c2t;kt+1;bt;ltg
1
t=0, the competitive prices can be backed out using ￿rms￿￿rst order con-








t=0 is recovered from the households￿
￿rst-order conditions (27)-(29), the implementability constraints (34), and the debt level is
found from the market clearing condition in the capital markets. Substituting Uc1t; Qc2t+1;
Ult and Qbt+1 from the individual optimal conditions in the implementability constraint we
obtain the intertemporal consumer budget constraint. Finally, given the tax on capital in-
come ￿k
t+1 and the net interest rate rt+1; by arbitrage we ￿nd the return on government debt.
If the resource constraint and the consumers￿budget constraints are satis￿ed, Walras law
ensures that the government budget constraint is also satis￿ed.
Proof of Proposition 1: In order to derive a solution to the Ramsey allocation problem, we
rede￿ne the government objective function by introducing the implementability constraint














where ￿t is the Lagrange multiplier associated to the implementability constraint of a gener-
ation born at period t: The additional term measures the e⁄ect of distortionary taxes on the





t+1)2 = 0; 8t ￿ 0: (A.2)
It is clear that neither bt+1 = 0 by the Inada conditions, nor Uc1t+1 = 0 since then c1t+1 ! 1,
nor ￿c
t+1 ! 1. Therefore ￿t+1 = 0; which means that after choosing the optimal alloca-
tion, the government determines the optimal consumption tax such that the restriction is
satis￿ed. Note that it is irrelevant whether the initial consumption tax ￿c
0 is or not given.
This instrument cannot be used by the government to control b0, since (34) and (35) have




Proof of Proposition 2: Rede￿ning the government objective function, the government
period utility for a newborn generation becomes
U(c1t;lt) + ￿Z(c2t+1) + ￿t
￿
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where ￿t and ’ are the Lagrange multipliers of (42) and (43), respectively. The ￿rst-order
conditions of the government problem with respect to ￿c
0; b0; ￿c




0)2 (￿0 ￿ ’) + ’
￿Zc20
￿
1 + (1 ￿ ￿k
0)(fk0 ￿ ￿)
￿
(k0 + d0)(1 + n)
￿(1 + ￿c
































































￿￿t (1 + n) + ￿t+1
￿
1 + fkt+1 ￿ ￿
￿
= 0; (A.12)
where ￿t is the Lagrange multiplier associated to the resource constraint. In view of (A.7)
and (A.8), the existence of consumption taxes is not essential to the government. Although
the role of the initial consumption tax ￿c
0 could seem quite di⁄erent, since from (A.5) and
(A.6) we have ’ = 0; which implies by (A.6) and (A.8) that ￿t = 0 8t ￿ 0; in fact it is
not the case and we do not need any initial tax to be in the ￿rst-best path from t = 0.
Combining (A.9), (A.11) and (A.12), and after using (A.8), we have
￿t =
￿
1 + fkt+1 ￿ ￿
￿
￿Zc2t+1 ￿ Uc1t
Uc1t + c1tUc1tc1t + ltUltc1t ￿
￿






18From (39) we have that if in steady state ￿k = 0 then from (A.13) and after (A.8) and (A.6)
we are in the ￿rst-best path from t = 0. If we are not in the ￿rst-best path then ￿k 6= 0:
In fact, given ￿c
0 and the ￿rst-best path, b0 can be adjusted such that (43) is satis￿ed and
’ = 0 (just choosing the suitable c10 the individual chooses the government required b0);
b1=(1 + ￿c
1) can be adjusted such that (42) is satis￿ed and ￿0 = 0; and so on.
Proof of Proposition 3: Rede￿ning the government objective function, the government


























c20Xc20 + b0X!0 ￿
Xc20
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1 + (1 ￿ ￿k
0)(fk0 ￿ ￿)
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where  t and ￿ are the Lagrange multipliers of (51) and (52), respectively. The ￿rst-order
conditions of the government problem with respect to ￿c
0; b0; ￿c


























































t+1)2 = 0; (A.18)
￿
￿
X!t+1 +  t
￿










19Combining (A.16) and (A.17), and (A.18) and (A.19), we have, respectively,






























Although it seems that another initial tax is needed to be in the ￿rst-best path, it is not
the case. In fact, given the ￿rst-best path, ￿c
0 and b0 can be adjusted such that !0 takes
the ￿rst-best value and (52) is satis￿ed, so that ￿ = 0; ￿c
1 and b1 can be adjusted such that
!1 takes the ￿rst-best value and (51) is satis￿ed, so that  0 = 0; and so on. If the initial
consumption tax ￿c
0 is given then ￿ 6= 0; but  t = 0 for all t:
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